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0. Introduction
One of the most controversial issues in the history of the Indo-
Tibetan Madhyamaka tradition was whether the followers of this 
system might legitimately set forth a propositional thesis and for-
mulate a logical proof for the purpose of demonstrating to others 
Madhyamaka doctrines such as dependent origination (pratītya-
samutpāda), emptiness (śūnyatā), and the lack of the self-existence 
(niḥsvabhāvatā) of all things in ultimate reality (paramā rtha). In 
the seventh century, the Madhyamaka master Candrakīrti respond-
ed to the view that the Mādhyamika should accept the general 
rules for dialectical discourse proposed by the Buddhist logician 
Dignāga (fi fth–sixth c.), which supposedly became authoritative 
soon after Dignāga’s main works, the Nyāyamukha (hereafter 
NM) and the Pramāṇasamuccaya (hereafter PS), came into cir-
culation. In the fi rst chapter of his Prasannapadā (hereafter Pr), 
Candrakīrti attempts to defend the earlier Madhyamaka inter-
preter Buddhapālita’s (ca. 500)1 use of consequences (prasaṅga), 
  The earliest version of the present paper was read at the 14th World 
Sanskrit Conference held in Kyoto on September 1, 2009, under the title “The 
Logical Value of Thesis (pratijñā) in Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka Thought.” 
I published its revised Japanese version, “Candrakīrti no ronrigaku” (Logic 
adopted by Candrakīrti), in Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū (Journal of Indian 
and Buddhist Studies) 59/1, 2010. The present paper is based on the latter’s 
updated and elaborated version, which was presented at the Department of 
South Asian Studies, Harvard University, on March 20, 2012, under the title 
“Can a Mādhyamika attend a debate and win? Candrakīrti on Dignāga’s 
Logic.” I am deeply indebted to Dr. Anne MacDonald for her kind help to 
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while criticizing the interpreter Bhāviveka (sixth c.),2 who followed 
Dignāga in maintaining that proper argumentation requires a for-
mal inferential proof consisting of a thesis (pratijñā), a reason 
(hetu) and an example (dṣṭānta). 
The philosophical statements regarding ultimate reality made 
by Nāgārjuna (second c.) occur primarily in the form of negation. 
For instance, in the initial verse of his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 
(hereafter MMK), he declares the non-origination of all things 
by negating the four alternatives of the tetralemma (catuṣkoṭi),3 
i.e., origination from self, from another, from both, or from no 
cause. What Nāgārjuna repudiates is the origination of things 
postulated as real entities by his substantialist opponent. As the 
Vigrahavyāvartanī (hereafter VV), ascribed to Nāgārjuna, states,4 
the Mādhyamika’s negation can be compared to a magically cre-
ated person warding oﬀ  another magical person in a magic show, 
because what is to be negated is a mere superimposition and there-
fore from the Madhyamaka viewpoint non-existent in reality. Since 
the object of negation does not exist, a negating subject cannot exist 
either. Accordingly, the Mādhyamika does not positively establish 
anything at all, and only indirectly demonstrates on the conven-
tional level, for instance, the tenet of dependent origination through 
the negation of superimposed origination. It is in this sense that 
the Mādhyamika is said to have no thesis of his own (svapratijñā). 
improve the present paper and for her most valuable comments.
 1 For Buddhapālita’s dates, Kajiyama (1987) has given “ca. 470–540.” Cf. 
also Saito’s (1988) proposal for ca. 370–450 and Khangkar’s (1991) proposal 
for ca. 230–330. 
 2 According to Kajiyama (1987), ca. 500–570. Krasser’s recent research 
(see Krasser 2012) suggests a post-Dharmakīrti date.
 3 For the tetralemma used by the Mādhyamika, see, e.g., Seyfort Ruegg 
1977: 34ﬀ . and 2000: 109–112 n.5.
 4 VV 23 (Johnston and Kunst 1978: 57, Yonezawa 2008: 256, cf. Seyfort 
Ruegg 2000: 119ﬀ .): nirmitako nirmitakaṃ māyāpuruṣaḥ svamāyayā sṣṭam / 
pratiṣedhayeta yadvat pratiṣedho ʾyaṃ tathaiva syāt  //; VV 63 (Johnston 
and Kunst 1978: 79, Yonezawa 2008: 316): pratiṣedhayāmi nāhaṃ kiṃcit 
pratiṣedhyam asti na ca kiṃcit / tasmāt pratiṣedhayasīty adhilaya eva* tvayā 
kriyate //. *Johnston and Kunst reads eṣa.
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Candrakīrti, citing the well-known VV verses,5 distinctly states in 
his Pr that the Mādhyamika does not have any thesis of his own.6
Nāgārjuna’s recommendation to abstain from disputation and 
assertion is considered to have its roots in early Buddhist thought: 
the person seeking release from saṃsāra is strongly advised to 
avoid adhering to a particular philosophical view (dṣṭi, Pāli: diṭṭhi) 
or asserting one in a debate (vāda), for such adherence is an obsta-
cle to liberation (nirvāṇa). For instance, one repeatedly encounters 
warnings against disputation in the oldest part of the Suttanipāta,7 
which suggests that even during the earliest phase of the doctrine, 
Buddhist monks had opportunities to participate in public or pri-
vate debates and that some of them had taken up the challenge.
However, with the dissemination of Dignāga’s views on logic 
among Indian Buddhists, neither Bhāviveka nor Candrakīrti could 
aﬀ ord to distance themselves from the scene of dialectical debates. 
It was necessary to employ eﬀ ective tools that would be able to 
verify Nāgārjuna’s teachings and to deal with opponent objections. 
They had to decide, fi rst of all, whether to accept the system of in-
ference-for-others (parārthānumāna) created by Dignāga. 
 5 VV 29–30 cited in Pr LVP 16, 7–10 (D 6a3f., P 6b5f.): yadi kācana 
pratijñā syān me tata eva* me bhaved doṣaḥ / nāsti ca mama pratijñā tasmān 
naivāsti me doṣaḥ // yadi kiṃcid upalabheyaṃ pravartayeyaṃ nivartayeyaṃ 
vā / pratyakṣādibhir arthais tadabhāvān me ʾnupālambhaḥ //. *Johnston and 
Kunst 1978: 61 and Yonezawa 2008: 268 read eṣa. For further investigation 
of these verses, cf. Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 115 infra.
 6 See, e.g., Pr LVP 23, 3: nāsmākaṃ svapratijñāyā abhāvāt /.
 7 See, e.g., Suttanipāta (Aṭṭhakavagga, tr. Norman 1995) 787: upayo hi 
dhammesu upeti vādaṃ, anūpayaṃ kena kathaṃ vadeyya, attaṃ nirattaṃ 
na hi tassa atthi: adhosi so diṭṭhi-m-idh ʾ eva sabbā. “A person who clings [to 
a view] indeed clings to a dispute with regard to doctrines. By what [means] 
and how could one dispute with one who does not cling [to a view]? For he 
has taken up or laid down nothing. He has shaken oﬀ  all views in this very 
world.” 832: ye diṭṭhim uggayha vivādiyanti idam eva saccan ti ca vādiyanti, 
te tvaṃ vadassu, na hi te dʾha atthi vādamhi jāte paṭisenikattā. “If people 
take up a view and dispute, and say, only this is true, tell them, there is no op-
ponent for you here when a dispute has arisen.” As for the Buddhist concept 
of dṣṭi, cf. Halbfass 1988: 266f.
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In PS 3.1 Dignāga states:
An inference-for-others, however, elucidates the matter (artha) [i.e., 
reason (hetu)] which [the proponent] has understood himself (svadṣ-
ta). There, the presentation of the inferendum (anumeya) is held to 
have the goal of the reason (hetu) as its object.8
PS 3.2 sets forth the defi nition of the thesis (pratijñā):
[A valid thesis] is one which is intended by [the proponent] himself 
(sva yam iṣṭa) as something to be stated in its proper form alone [i.e., 
as a sādhya]; [and] with regard to [the proponent’s] own subject, it is 
not opposed by perceptible objects, by inference, by authorities or by 
what is commonly recognized.9
According to the commentator Dharmakīrti (seventh c.), with the 
word artha of PS 3.1, Dignāga means that the logical reason (hetu) 
of an inference must be an artha which does not have a concep-
tually superimposed nature but is rather a real matter ascertained 
by the proponent himself.10 Additionally, the thesis (pratijñā) must 
 8 PS 3.1 (Tillemans 2000: 9; Katsura 2009:159; cf. PVin 3.1ab): 
parārtham anumānaṃ* tu svadṣṭārthaprakāśanam  / tatrānumeyanirdeśo 
hetvarthaviṣayo mataḥ  //. *parārthānumānaṃ in Tillemans 2000. The 
English translation follows Tillemans 2000.
 9 PS 3.2 (Tillemans 2000: 9; Katsura 2009: 159; cf. PVin 3.6ab): sva-
rū peṇaiva nirdeśyaḥ svayam iṣṭo ʾnirāktaḥ / pratyakṣārthānumānāpta pra-
siddhena svadharmiṇi  // The English translation follows Tillemans 2000. 
For further analysis of these two verses, cf. Tillemans loc. cit. Cf. also NM 
1: svayaṃ sādhyatvenepsitaḥ pakṣo viruddhārthānirāktaḥ  /; NB 3.38: 
svarūpeṇaiva svayam iṣṭo ʾnirāktaḥ pakṣa iti  //. In PS 3.3 and 3.5 respec-
tively Dignāga refutes the Nyāyasūtra’s defi nition of the thesis as a presenta-
tion of the probandum (sādhyanirdeśa) and that of Vasubandhu’s Vādavidhi 
as a statement of the probandum (sādhyābhidhāna). See Tillemans 2000: 39 
n. 145.
 10 PV 4.13 (Tillemans 2000: 24f.): tad arthagrahaṇaṃ śabdakalpanā-
ropi tātmanām  / aliṅgatvaprasiddhyartham arthād arthaprasiddhitaḥ  // (tr. 
Tillemans) “This word ‘state of aﬀ airs’ [in Dignāga’s defi nition of an in-
ference-for-others, i.e., svadṣṭārthaprakāśana] is designed to establish that 
things whose natures are verbally and conceptually superimposed are not 
[valid] reasons, for [one] state of aﬀ airs [viz., the sādhya] is established from 
[another] state of aﬀ airs [viz., the reason].”; cf. PVin 3: 1, 5f. ad 3.1cd: atra 
svadṣṭārthagrahaṇam āgamāt paradṣṭaṃ na sādhanaṃ nāpy anarthataḥ //. 
Reasoning-for-others in Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka thought 417
be one which the proponent himself accepts (vādyabhyupagata  / 
vādyabhyupagama), intends in a real sense (arthokta) and wish-
es to prove.11 If Dharmakīrti correctly interprets Dignāga’s words, 
these two verses amply demonstrate that it is impossible for the 
Mādhyamika to accept these defi nitions because the Mādhyamika 
holds that any subject of or reason for a thesis is unreal and mere-
ly conceptual superimposition. Even if the Mādhyamika would set 
forth the negation of the subject as a thesis and would attempt to 
prove it by means of a logical reason (hetu), this logical reason 
would not meet the fi rst of the three conditions (trirūpa) of a valid 
reason as asserted by Dignāga, viz., the requirement that the rea-
son should reside in the locus (i.e., pakṣadharmatva), because the 
locus, that is, subject, is not established for the Mādhyamika him-
self. On account of this lack of establishment, the Mādhyamika 
would also violate another important requirement for a proper in-
ference-for-others, namely, that the subject and the reason be estab-
lished for both parties in a debate (ubhayasiddhatva).12 It is impos-
sible for the Mādhyamika to comply with this requirement, for he 
does not accept the ontological existence of the entities posited by 
non-Mādhyamika debators.
In brief, the Madhyamaka thinkers after the time of Dignāga had 
to confront and fi nd solutions to these problems if they wanted to 
participate in dialectical discourse with disputants from philosoph-
ical backgrounds completely diﬀ erent from their own. Bhāviveka 
dealt with the problem by making allowance for the employment 
of Dignāgean logic within the sphere of transactional usage (vy-
avahāra), that is, on the conventional (saṃvti) level.13 Bhāviveka 
 11 PV 4.29ab (Tillemans 2000: 48; cf. PVin 3.6cd): asiddhāsādhanārthok-
tavādyabhyupagata*grahaḥ  //. (tr. Tillemans) “..., one understands that 
[the thesis] is unestablished [for the opponent], is not a sādhana, is stat-
ed according to the [real] sense and is what is accepted by the proponent 
(vādin).”*abhyupagama PVin 3.6cd. Cf. further PV 4.28 and Tillemans 
2000: 48ﬀ . 
 12 See section 3 of the present paper and n. 55 below.
 13 In the twenty-seventh chapter of his Prajñāpradīpa (hereafter Prajp, 
D257b3–258b5, P323a5–325a3, tr. Ejima 1980: 42–55), Bhāviveka systemat-
ically denies the ultimate establishment of a means of valid cognition (tshad 
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accepts, in accordance with Dignāga’s epistemological views, di-
rect perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna) as means 
of valid cognition (pramāṇa) and also acquiesces to the afore-
mentioned demand for common establishment.14 In Bhāviveka’s 
system, the subject of the thesis, e.g., “things” (bhāvāḥ), is con-
ventionally established for both the Mādhyamika and his oppo-
nent, and the Mādhyamika proves, as his own thesis (pratijñā) or 
probandum (sādhya), the non-origination of things.15 In this way, 
Bhāviveka makes it possible for the Mādhyamika to set forth an 
inference-for-others within the realm of transactional usage (vy-
avahāra). He sets aside the Mādhyamika’s ultimate ontological 
position that things are not real or self-existent in order to allow 
the Mādhyamika to debate with others, in spite of the illusion-like 
nature of his negative theses.
Candrakīrti, on the contrary, makes no such compromise. In his 
mind, Bhāviveka, or anyone else who claims to be a Mādhyamika, 
should not employ a formal probative inference of his own in a 
debate with substantialist opponents because it is impossible for 
the Mādhyamika to accept the ontological status attributed to the 
subject by the opponents even on the conventional level. If he nev-
ma, pramāṇa), including direct perception (mngon sum, pratyakṣa) and in-
ference (rjes dpag, anumāna), the members of an inference, i.e., inferendum 
(sgrub bya, sādhya), thesis (dam bca ,ʾ pratijñā), reason (gtan tshigs, hetu), 
and example (dpe, dṣṭānta), the statement equipped with these members, 
and refutation (sun ʾbyin, dūṣaṇa). He makes this denial at the end of his 
Prajp after having used these logical tools for interpreting the MMK. 
 14 Prajp (chap. 18) D 182b2f., P 227a6f. (cf. Ejima 1980:190 and Yoshimizu 
2003: 280 n.24): gzhan gyi phyogs ʾbaʾ zhig la grags paʾi phyogs kyi chos kyis 
ni bsgrub par bya baʾi don bsgrub mi nus par nges par gzung ste / gang yang 
rung ba la ma grub paʾi phyir gzhan gyi phyogs la ma grub pa bzhin pas … /.
 15 Bhāviveka concurs with Dignāga’s defi nition of the thesis that it is the 
presentation of the probandum (sādhya) which is intended by the proponent 
himself and is not opposed by incompatible objects. See Prajp (chap. 27) D 
257b6f., P 323b8f. (tr. Ejima 1980: 46): de bzhin du dam bcas pa la sogs pa 
sgrub paʾi yan lag rnams la yang  / (P omits  /) de dag gi sgrub par bya ba 
bstan pa (P omits bstan pa) ni bsgrub par bya ba nges par gzung ste / sgrub 
par ʾdod pas bsgrub par bya ba nyid du ʾdod paʾi phyogs don ʾgal ba la sogs pas 
ma brtsams pa gang yin pa ni dam bcas paʾi mtshan nyid yin no //. 
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ertheless enters into debate with them under the same rules, he 
will either have to abandon the doctrine of non-substantiality and 
hence relinquish being a Mādhyamika, or remain an adherent of 
the Madhyamaka view but accept that his inference will be inva-
lid because the subject is not established for him. As will be seen 
below, Candrakīrti indeed censures Bhāviveka for committing the 
latter fault. 
Candrakīrti terms Bhāviveka’s inferential proof “independent 
inference” (svatantrānumāna), presumably understanding this 
sort of inference to be one in which the subject of the thesis, the 
logical reason, and the example are established for the proponent 
himself, independent of another’s thesis.16 This naturally links up 
with Candrakīrti’s rejection of the idea that the Mādhyamika has 
a thesis (i.e., the rejection of svapratijñā). If the subject or thesis 
is not established for the Mādhyamika himself, he does not have 
one. Candrakīrti thus disallows the use of a thesis as defi ned by 
Dignāga, i.e., a thesis which is intended by the proponent himself 
(i.e., svayam iṣṭa; cf. PS 3.2). Rejecting, therefore, “independent 
inference,” Candrakīrti instead relies either on prasaṅga reason-
ing, which serves solely to negate an opponent’s thesis, or on oth-
er-acknowledged inference (paraprasiddhānumāna), the subject of 
which, as well as the reason, are established for the opponent but 
not for the Mādhyamika. By using these two kinds of reasoning, 
Candrakīrti was able to engage with the magic show without con-
tradicting Madhyamaka ontology. Indeed, foregoing the option to 
remain silent like a saint, Candrakīrti armed himself with reason-
ings for debates and polemical discussion. 
As a strong critic of both Bhāviveka and Dignāga, Candrakīrti, 
the reputed founder of the Prāsaṅgika branch of the Madhyamaka, 
has generally been considered to be a major challenger of the Indian 
Buddhist logical-epistemological tradition. It is sometimes even 
thought that he was opposed to all aspects of Dignāga’s logic. This 
is, however, in my view not true. On the contrary, Candrakīrti ac-
cepted Dignāga’s method of inference-for-others to a certain degree 
and applied it in regard to Nāgārjuna’s statements, the most promi-
 16 Cf. Yoshimizu 2003: 269 and the studies referred to at 276, n. 2.
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nent case occurring with his defense of Buddhapālita’s consequenc-
es, where he demonstrates their connection with inference-for-oth-
ers. I am of the opinion that Candrakīrti in fact attempted to create 
a type of reasoning-for-others for the Madhyamaka context, in-
tending for it to replace the Dignāgean inference-for-others. In the 
present paper, I shall attempt to clarify Candrakīrti’s logical project 
– aspects of which he owes to Dignāga as well as to Bhāviveka – 
which he designs with the aim of creating an environment favoura-
ble for Mādhyamika debaters.
1. Reasoning-for-others or pseudo-inference-for-others in Can-
dra kīrti’s interpretation of MMK 1.1
1.1 The introductory elucidation of MMK 1.1
Although he rejects the idea that the thesis of an inference, as 
defi ned by Dignāga, is intended by the Mādhyamika proponent 
himself, Candrakīrti nevertheless refers, as Bhāviveka also does 
in his own commentary, to some statements in Nāgārjuna’s MMK 
as “theses” (pratijñā),17 notably to the negative statement of the 
MMK’s initial verse.
MMK 1.1: Never do any things exist anywhere originated either from 
themselves, from another, from both, or from no cause.18
Candrakīrti does not view this verse as aiming to establish either 
the non-origination of all things or the negation of the four kinds of 
origination. Rather, it must be seen as solely negating the types of 
origination imagined by the opponent.19 Still, he calls these nega-
 17 Seyfort Ruegg (2000: 129ﬀ .) enumerates Candrakīrti’s use of the term 
in both the Pr and the MAv.
 18 MMK 1.1: na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpy ahetutaḥ / utpannā 
jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana //.
 19 Candrakīrti’s position is that mere negation is not the probandum to 
be established by the Mādhyamika. Early Tibetan Mādhyamikas such as Pa 
tshab Nyi ma grags (1055?–1145?) and Zhang Thang sag pa ʾByung gnas ye 
shes (alias Ye shes ʾbyung gnas, twelfth c.) elaborate on this idea. Pa tshab 
says that the Mādhyamika does not even approve negation as the probandum 
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tions “theses” (pratijñā). Candrakīrti’s ambiguous use of the term 
pratijñā has puzzled modern scholars. It is highly unlikely that 
Candrakīrti blindly relied upon his predecessor Bhāviveka’s under-
standing of it.20 Nor is Candrakīrti’s position accurately represent-
ed if one distinguishes between “acceptable theses” and “unaccept-
able theses” from the viewpoint that the Mādhyamika may state a 
thesis only if it does not presuppose a self-existent property (sva-
bhāva or svalakṣaṇa),21 because nowhere does Candrakīrti suggest 
such a distinction. My conjecture is that he uses the term pratijñā 
to refer to a statement that is presented for the sake of teaching 
others and that is to be substantiated by a reasoning in the form of 
(dBu ma rtsa ba shes rab kyi ti ka 11a9, p. 49 cited in Dreyfus and Tsering 
2010: 402, n.25: nged la dgag pa tsam gyi bsgrub byaʾang dʾod pa med de / 
dgag byaʾi rang bzhin ma grub pas na bkag pa yang mi ʾthad ste); Zhang 
Thang sag pa describes the same idea with the words, “it is nothing” (ci yang 
ma yin, dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka 15a3). By emphasizing the negation of 
negation, they argue against the Indian Madhyamaka masters from the East, 
i.e., the so-called Svātantrika masters, Jñānagarbha (eighth c.), Śāntarakṣita 
(eighth c.) and Kamalaśīla (? –797?) (for detail, cf. Yoshimizu 2010a: 455 
infra.). Kamalaśīla takes the position that the Mādhyamika should establish 
as his own probandum the negation of a superimposed entity, saying that the 
Mādhyamika’s non-implicative negation (prasajyapratiṣedha) establishes 
the negation of an intrinsic nature superimposed by his opponent. Cf., e.g., 
MĀ D172a6f.: gang la dngos poʾi chos yod paʾi ngo bor sgrub par mi dʾod kyi 
ʾon kyang sgro btags paʾi chos rnam par gcad pa sgrub pa tsam zhig brjod par 
dʾod pa de la ma grub pa nyid la sogs paʾi nyes pa brjod pa tha snyad du yang 
dngos por gyur paʾi chos can mi dgos te /.
 20 Matsumoto (1997: 327f., 383) infers that Candrakīrti merely followed 
Bhāviveka in referring to MMK 1.1 as theses.
 21 The distinction from an ontological viewpoint has been proposed by 
Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 129f. and Yotsuya 2006: 117. Rejecting this distinction, 
Tanji (1992: 239) has expressed the opinion that Candrakīrti uses the term 
“theses” in reference to the negations of MMK 1.1, in the sense that these 
theses are established solely for the opponent, in contrast to Bhāviveka, who 
uses the same term to refer to logical theses established for the Mādhyamika 
himself. This interpretation makes sense if one takes Nāgārjuna’s negations 
as the theses of other-acknowledged inferences (paraprasiddhānumāna). 
Oetke (2003a) has also criticized Seyfort Ruegg’s distinction and his under-
standing that the Madhyamaka tenet does not presuppose the existence of 
anything.   
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either a prasaṅga or an other-acknowledged inference (paraprasi-
ddhānumāna).22 If this is the case, this thesis would constitute a 
part of a reasoning-for-others in the same manner that Dignāga’s 
thesis constitutes a part of an inference-for-others (parārthānumā-
na).
To confi rm this conjecture, I would fi rst like to examine 
Candrakīrti’s introductory elucidation of MMK 1.1 in his Pr (LVP 
12, 8–14, 1), in which the term “thesis” (pratijñā) is employed, 
which he presents as follows. I will summarize the points with spe-
cial attention to the underlined words:
1. Candrakīrti fi rst explains that it is with a desire to expound 
(pratipādayiṣayā) dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) 
that Nāgārjuna, to start, takes up the negation of origination.23
2. Candrakīrti then explains that Nāgārjuna declares MMK 1.1 
having ascertained (niścitya) that origination is inappropriate 
in all ways.24 
3. Candrakīrti explains how pāda cd of the verse should be read. 
The concluding sentence runs as follows: “The [other] three 
theses [negating origination from another, from both and 
 22 In this regard, Zhang Thang sag pa, a Tibetan commentator on the Pr, 
may be right in describing the thesis accepted by Candrakīrti as a “mere the-
sis” (dam bcaʾ tsam) and opposing it to a “genuine thesis” (dam bcaʾ rnal ma), 
which bears the thesis-characteristics as defi ned by Dignāga in PS 3.2 (dBu 
ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka 10b1, cited and translated in Yoshimizu 2010a: 448). 
Zhang also applies the term “pseudo-thesis” (ltar snang dam bcaʾ) to the the-
sis of a prasaṅga reasoning (ibid., 12a1f., cited and translated in Yoshimizu 
2010a: 453 n. 28). 
 23 Pr LVP 12, 8: idānīm anirodhādiviśiṣṭapratītyasamutpādapratipāda yi-
ṣayā utpādapratiṣedhena nirodhādipratiṣedhasaukaryaṃ manyamāna ācā-
ryaḥ prathamam evotpādapratiṣedham ārabhate. “Now, with the desire to 
expound dependent origination qualifi ed [in the introductory verses of the 
MMK] as being without cessation, etc., the master [Nāgārjuna], thinking that 
the negation of cessation, etc., is easy [to accomplish] through negating origi-
nation, takes up right at the beginning the negation of origination. Indeed, 
origination as postulated by other [thinkers] is postulated [as being] from 
self, or it is postulated [as being] from other, from both, or from no cause.”
 24 Pr LVP 12, 12: sarvathā ca nopapadyata iti niścityāha.
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from no cause] are to be construed in the same manner [as 
the negation of origination from self]” (evaṃ pratijñātrayam 
api yojyam Pr LVP 13, 3). 
4. Candrakīrti notes that these negations are non-implicative 
(prasajyapratiṣedha).25 
5. Candrakīrti subsequently quotes MAv 6.826 and Buddhapālita’s 
commentarial statement on MMK 1.1, which he considers to 
provide a reasoning (upapatti) for Nāgārjuna’s negations or 
“theses.” Candrakīrti says: “Moreover, the reasoning (upa-
patti) based on which [one concludes that] origination from 
self cannot occur is to be determined (avaseya) by relying 
on [my] Madhyamakāvatāra [viz., MAv 6.8] and so on. For 
his part (tu),27 the master Buddhapālita states [the following 
reasoning].”28 
This introductory elucidation of MMK 1.1 informs us how 
Nāgārjuna came to present the teaching of non-origination and that 
Buddhapālita as well as Candrakīrti proved it. This may also be 
construed as occurring in a logical process, as follows: 
[1] Nāgārjuna’s desire to expound dependent origination (iṣā)
[2] Nāgārjuna’s ascertainment (niścaya) of non-origination
[3] Nāgārjuna’s declaration of the four theses (pratijñā) for the nega-
tation of origination
 25 Pr LVP 13, 5f.: prasajyapratiṣedhasya vivakṣitatvāt parato ʾpy utpādasya 
pratiṣetsyamānatvāt.
 26 MAv 6.8 (cited in Pr LVP 13, 7–8): tasmād dhi tasya bhavane na guṇo 
ʾsti kaścij / jātasya janma punar eva ca naiva yuktam //.
 27 For the interpretation of this expression tu, see MacDonald 2003: 147f.
 28 Pr LVP 13, 6–14, 1: yayā copapattyā svata utpādo na saṃbhavati, sā 
(MAv 6.8) tasmād dhi tasya bhavane na guṇo ʾsti kaścij jātasya janma pu-
nar eva ca naiva yuktaṃ / ityādinā madhyamakāvatārādidvāreṇāvaseyā* // 
ācāryabuddhapālitas tv āha /. *MacDonald (2008: 27f.) reports that neither 
the palm-leaf manuscript of the Pr from the late twelfth or the thirteenth 
century (Ms. P) nor the manuscript relied on by the author of the *LṬ refer to 
the Madhyamakāvatāra as the source of the quotation. She suspects that the 
name of the text is an interpolation.
424  Chizuko Yoshimizu
[4] Proposition of a reasoning (upapatti) by Buddhapālita and 
Candrakīrti.
It thus consists of the four steps: [1] desire (iṣā or icchā), [2] ascer-
tainment (niścaya), [3] thesis (pratijñā), and [4] reasoning (upapat-
ti). The order of [1] and [2] are to be reversed, as will be seen below.
It should be noted that these same four steps are fi rst mentioned 
by Bhāviveka in his Prajñāpradīpa. Candrakīrti likely adopted the 
idea of this logical process as well as the style of elucidation from 
Bhāviveka’s work, for the Pr and the Prajp show strong similarities 
in this regard.29 According to Bhāviveka, Nāgārjuna had a desire 
to teach (bstan par bzhed nas, *pratipādayiṣayā) the non-origina-
tion of all things;30 by virtue of his own ascertainment (rang la 
nges paʾi dbang gis, *svaniścayavaśāt) of the non-origination of all 
things through argument and scripture (rigs pa dang lung gis, *yuk-
tyāgamena), Nāgārjuna set forth the group of the four theses (dam 
bcaʾ paʾi spyi, *pratijñāsamūha?) in the form of non-implicative 
negations (med par dgag pa, *prasajyapratiṣedha). Bhāviveka fur-
ther asserts that because a mere thesis (dam bcas pa tsam, *prati-
jñāmātra) is unable to establish the intended (bsams pa) meaning 
of the statement (tshig gi don, *vākyārtha), one should understand 
that a logical reason, i.e., the property of being existent which 
qualifi es the subject (phyogs chos, *pakṣadharma), and an example 
(dpe, *dṣṭānta) are implied.31 What is distinctive in Bhāviveka’s 
 29 Cf. Prajp D48b1–8, P57b3–58a5 cited in n. 31 below. In Buddhapālita’s 
commentary (BMv D161a7–162a1) one does not see the idea of such a logical 
process for teaching non-origination.
 30 One should note that according to Candrakīrti, Nāgārjuna desired to 
expound dependent origination.
 31 See Prajp D48b1–8, P57b3–58a5 (underlining by the present author): 
slob dpon gyis (P gyi) rten cing ʾbrel bar ʾbyung ba skye ba med pa la sogs pa 
thun mong ma yin paʾi khyad par dang ldan pa de kho na ston par mdzad pa 
nyid kyis bcom ldan dʾas la mngon par stod nas / skye ba med pa bstan nas 
ʾgag pa med pa la sogs pa khyad par bstan sla bar dgongs pa na skye ba med 
pa dang por bstan par bzhed nas / gzhan gyis yongs su brtags (P brtag) paʾi 
skye ba rnam par rtog pa mngon sum du mdzad de / dʾi ltar skye bar smra ba 
dag las kha cig ni dngos po rnams bdag las skyeʾo zhes zer / (P omits /) gzhan 
dag ni gzhan las so zhes zer / kha cig ni gnyis las so zhes zer / gzhan dag ni 
rgyu med pa las so zhes zer ba dag rigs pa dang lung gis brtags pa na skye 
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explanation is his determination that each of Nāgārjuna’s theses has 
to be endowed with a logical reason which fulfi ls the three condi-
tions (trirūpaliṅga)32 because, as Bhāviveka maintains, Nāgārjuna 
himself ascertained the non-origination of all things by way of, in 
addition to scripture (āgama), argument (yukti).33 
In contrast, Candrakīrti does not delineate the argumenta-
tion that led Nāgārjuna to the ascertainment of non-origination. 
Instead, he introduces the reasoning (upapatti)34 formulated by 
Buddhapālita: “Things do not arise from themselves, because 
their arising [from themselves] would be purposeless and there 
would be the fault of absurdity [in the re-arising of things already 
ba rnam par thams cad du ʾthad pa mi bzod par rang la nges paʾi dbang gis 
(P gi) / bdag las ma yin gzhan las min (P ma yin) // gnyis las ma yin rgyu med 
min // dngos po gang dag gang na yang // skyes pa nam yang yod ma yin // 
(P /) zhes bya ba gsungs te / dʾi ni dam bcas paʾi spyi dkod pa yin no // de la 
re zhig bdag las ma yin zhes bya ba ci zhig ce na / skyes pa nam yang yod ma 
yin // zhes bya ba la sogs pa ste / re re dang sbyar bar byaʾo // bdag las zhes 
bya ba ni bdag las zhes bya baʾi tha tshig go // dam bcas pa tsam gyis bsams 
paʾi tshig gi don mi ʾgrub pas  / dʾir phyogs kyi chos ni yod pa nyid yin par 
gzung ste / dʾi ltar bdag las zhes bya ba ni bdag nyid yod pa la snyad gdags 
paʾi phyir ro // dpe ni bsgrub par bya ba dang / sgrub paʾi chos kyi dbang gis te 
bsgrub par bya ba dang (P inserts /) sgrub paʾi chos grags pa dang ldan paʾi 
chos can gyi dpe yin paʾi phyir ro // bdag las ma yin zhes bya baʾi dgag pa dʾi 
ni med par dgag paʾi don du lta bar bya ste / dgag pa gtso che baʾi phyir dang / 
dʾi ltar rtogs pa ma lus paʾi drang (P dra ba) dgag pas rnam par mi rtog paʾi 
ye shes zhes bya baʾi yul ma lus pa dang ldan pa ʾgrub par dgongs paʾi phyir 
ro //.
 32 See further Prajp D148b5f., P184a7ﬀ . (cited and translated in Ejima 
1980: 148): dʾi ni bstan bcos byed paʾi tshig dag ni phal cher chos mthun paʾi 
mtshan nyid dang / (P omits /) chos mi mthun paʾi mtshan nyid dang / gtan 
tshigs kyi mtshan nyid gsum gyis tha snyad byed de (P inserts /) phyogs kyi 
chos nyid dang mthun paʾi phyogs la rjes su ʾgro ba dang  / mi mthun paʾi 
phyogs la (P omits la) med pas te / deʾi phyir phyogs tsam zhig bstan to //.
 33 Both scripture and argument are, of course, means of valid cognition 
(pramāṇa).
 34 In addition to the reasoning, Candrakīrti cites several scriptures in or-
der to confi rm that Nāgārjuna’s teaching of non-origination does not contra-
dict the Buddha’s words (cf. Pr LVP 38, 8 infra.).
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existing].”35 It is to be noted that when Candrakīrti speaks of 
Nāgārjuna’s ascertainment, he, unlike Bhāviveka, does not assert 
that it is Nāgārjuna’s own ascertainment (svaniścaya, rang la nges 
pa). It appears that he refrains from doing so in order to underscore 
his position that the Mādhyamika has no ascertainment of his own, 
just as he has no thesis. Although there are thus several crucial dif-
ferences in Candrakīrti’s and Bhāviveka’s presentations, it is still 
interesting to see that they adopt the same basic logical procedure 
consisting of four steps, [1] desire (iṣā, icchā), [2] ascertainment 
(niścaya), [3] thesis (pratijñā), and [4] reasoning (upapatti). More 
remarkable is that this is exactly the procedure pertaining to the 
inference-for-others (parārthānumāna) in Dignāga’s system, as 
Candrakīrti himself has indirectly disclosed.
 35 Pr LVP 14, 1–3 (tr. e.g., Tanji 1988: 11, Tillemans 1992: 315, Seyfort 
Ruegg 2002: 25, MacDonald 2003: 147f., Yotsuya 1999: 75 and 2006: 229f.): 
ācāryabuddhapālitas tv āha  / na svata utpadyante bhāvās tadutpāda-
vaiyarthyād (LVP -vaiyarthyāt,) atiprasaṅgadoṣāc ca, na hi svātmanā vi-
dya mānānāṃ padārthānāṃ punarutpāde prayojanam asti  / atha sann api 
jāyeta, na kadācin na jāyeteti //; Pr D5b1f., P6a2f. (cf. BMv D161b3ﬀ ., Prajp 
D49a5, P58b7f.): de la re zhig dngos po rnams bdag gi bdag nyid las skye 
ba med de  / de dag gi skye ba don med pa nyid du ʾgyur baʾi phyir dang  // 
skye ba shin tu thal bar ʾgyur baʾi phyir ro (BMv, Prajp: thug pa med par 
ʾgyur baʾi phyir ro)  // dʾi ltar dngos po bdag gi bdag nyid du yod pa rnams 
la yang skye ba dgos pa med do // gal te yod kyang yang skye na nam yang 
mi skye bar mi ʾgyur bas de yang mi dʾod de  / deʾi phyir re zhig dngos po 
rnams bdag las skye ba med do //. Candrakīrti renders it as a prasaṅga as 
well as other-acknowledged inferences (paraprasiddhānumāna). See Pr LVP 
20, 1–6 (cf. MacDonald 2003: 172): na svata utpadyante bhāvāḥ tadut pā-
da vaiyarthyād iti vacanāt  / atra hi tadaty anena svātmanā vidyamānasya 
parāmarśaḥ / [kasmād iti cet] tathā hi tasya [saṃ]graheṇ[okta]vākyasyaitad 
vivaraṇavākyaṃ na hi svātmanā vidyamānānāṃ punarutpāde prayojanam 
iti / anena ca vākyena sādhyasādhanadharmānugatasya paraprasiddhasya 
sā dharmyadṣṭāntasyopādānam / tatra svātmanā vidyamānasyety anena he-
tu parāmarśaḥ  / utpādavayarthyād ity anena sādhyadharmaparāmarśaḥ  //; 
21, 2ﬀ . (cited and translated in MacDonald 2003: 172): iha svātmanā 
vidyamānaṃ puro ʾvasthitaṃ ghaṭādikaṃ punar utpādān apekṣaṃ d ṣṭaṃ 
tathā ca mtpiṇḍādyavasthāyām api yadi svātmanā vidyamānaṃ gha ṭā di-
kam iti manyase tadāpi tasya svātmanā vidyamānasya nāsty utpāda iti  /; 
22, 3ﬀ . (cf. MacDonald 2003: 173): atha vāyam anyaḥ prayogamārgaḥ pu ru-
ṣa vyatiriktāḥ padārthāḥ svata utpattivādinaḥ tata eva na svata utpadyante 
svātmanā vidyamānatvāt puruṣavat itīdam udāharaṇam udāhāryam //.
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1.2 The regular rule (nyāya) of the inference-for-others 
In the course of his debate with Bhāviveka, Candrakīrti criticizes 
him for having claimed that Buddhapālita should have presented 
a formal inference against the Sāṃkhya opponent. Candrakīrti is 
of the opinion that introducing an inference is unnecessary be-
cause the Sāṃkhya is unable to convince the Mādhyamika of the 
correctness of the Sāṃkhya’s own thesis that things arise from 
themselves.36 In support of his view that the Mādhyamika does not 
need to present an inference, Candrakīrti refers to a rule (nyāya) 
of debate, citing Dignāga’s PS 4.6ab = NM 13ab (the underlined is 
Dignāga’s verse):
Because if a [disputant] proposes (pratijānīte) a [certain] matter 
( a rtha), he should, with the desire (icchā) to generate ascertainment 
(niścaya) in others just like [his] own ascertainment (svaniścayavat), 
teach others exactly the reasoning (upapatti) by means of which [he] 
has come to understand the matter. Therefore, this is, to start, the 
rule (nyāya), [namely,] that only the opponent [i.e., the Sāṃkhya, 
not Buddhapālita] (pareṇaiva) has to employ a proof of the matter 
proposed [on the basis of what he him]self has accepted (svābhyupa-
 36 According to the Tibetan commentator Zhang Thang sag pa, Bhāviveka’s 
objection as set forth in Pr LVP 18, 5–9 indicates that Buddhapālita is still 
wrong in not stating a logical reason and an example for an other-acknowl-
edged inference even if it is granted that the Mādhyamika should not use an 
independent-inference (cf. Yoshimizu 2006: 95–98, 114). This reading sup-
ports MacDonald’s interpretation of the same segment (2000, 2003: 170 in-
fra.), which has instigated discussion among modern scholars. For more de-
tails, see MacDonald 2000, 2003, Oetke 2003b, 2006, and Yonezawa 2004. 
In response to Bhāviveka’s objection, as MacDonald summarizes (2003: 173), 
Candrakīrti argues in the subsequent segment that the Mādhyamika does 
not need to formulate an other-acknowledged inference since the Sāṃkhya 
opponent fi rst has to prove his thesis, but is unable to do so (Pr LVP 19, 
1–7, cf. MacDonald 2003: 179 infra., where she closely discusses the text 
and content of this segment; cf. also Zhang Thang sag pa’s interpretation 
cited in Yoshimizu 2006: 96f.). However, at the next stage, Candrakīrti him-
self demonstrates how other-acknowledged inferences can be drawn out of 
Buddhapālita’s argument (cf. n. 35 above) and sanctions the Mādhyamika’s 
use of formal inferences.
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gamapratijñārthasādhanam37).38
For Candrakīrti, this rule of debate applies only to the Sāṃkhya 
and others who, unlike the Mādhyamikas, employ probative infer-
ences. Nevertheless, if we ignore the qualifi er sva- in svaniścaya(-
vat), one can readily recognize in this passage the four items which 
both Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti mention in regard to MMK 1.1: 
ascertainment (niścaya), desire (icchā), thesis-proposition (prati-
jñā, here verbalized as pratijānīte), and reasoning (upapatti).
Nāgārjuna, according to Candrakīrti, is said to have fi rst de-
sired to expound dependent origination. This desire theoretically 
presupposes his ascertainment of dependent origination. This as-
certainment is inextricably connected with the ascertainment of 
non-origination, and is followed by the desire to expound non-orig-
ination.39 Therefore, as mentioned earlier, it is correct to assume 
that “ascertainment” should precede “desire” in any logical listing 
of the steps. Nāgārjuna thus taught [3] the theses of MMK 1.1, [1] 
having ascertained the non-origination of things, with [2] the de-
sire to generate the same ascertainment in others. Buddhapālita 
and Candrakīrti supplied prasaṅga reasonings and other-acknowl-
edged inferences (paraprasiddhānumāna) for the accomplishment 
of this goal. The teaching of non-origination, in its various steps, 
 37 LVP reads: svābhyupagata-. According to MacDonald 2003: 179 n. 89, 
all the manuscripts attest svābhyupagama-.
 38 Pr LVP 19, 1ﬀ . (cited and translated in MacDonald 2003: 179f.): 
yasmād yo hi yam arthaṃ pratijānīte tena svaniścayavad anyeṣāṃ ni śca-
yotpādanecchayā yayopapattyāsāv artho dʾhigataḥ saivopapattiḥ para-
smāy upadeṣṭavyā. tasmād eṣa tāvan nyāyo yat pareṇaiva svābhyupa gama-
pratijñārthasādhanam upādeyam. Cf. PS 4.6 = NM 13 cited in PVBh 487, 
31 (cf. Katsura 1981: 73f. and Tillemans 2000: 31): svaniścayavad anyeṣāṃ 
ni ścayotpādanecchayā / pakṣadharmatvasaṃbandhasādhyokter anyavarja-
nam //. “With the desire to generate ascertainment in others just like [his] own 
ascertainment, the [reason’s] being the property of the subject, the necessary 
connection and what is to be proven are stated; anything other than [them] is 
excluded.” For problematic interpretations of this verse, see Tillemans 2000: 
31f.
 39 Bhāviveka mentions Nāgārjuna’s desire to expound non-origination, but 
does not mention his desire to expound dependent origination, as has been 
seen above. 
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has been undertaken by the Mādhyamikas for the sake of others. 
This indeed accords with the above Dignāgean rule for debate. In 
the larger context of the Pr citation, however, where the rule is cited 
with a view to defl ecting Bhāviveka’s criticism of Buddhapālita, 
it is used to show that in this specifi c case only the Sāṃkhya op-
ponent is required to employ a proof of the matter that he accepts 
(svābhyupagama). Candrakīrti later explains that the Mādhyamika 
should not use such an independent inference but may present a 
proof of the matter based on that which is accepted by the opponent 
alone (i.e., an other-acknowledged inference). 
I am fairly convinced that in their introductory elucidation of 
MMK 1.1 both Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti aimed to show that 
the Mādhyamikas, viz., Nāgārjuna and themselves, presented the 
teaching of non-origination following the proper logical procedure 
required for the doctrinal debates of their time. To this extent, they 
assent to Dignāga’s regulation as contained in PS 4.6ab (NM 13ab). 
Interestingly, Candrakīrti does not quote the last half of this verse, 
in which the pakṣadharmatva is mentioned. Instead, he says that 
the proponent should teach others “reasoning” (upapatti). upapatti 
is exactly the word he uses to refer to the reasonings Buddhapālita 
and later he himself provide for Nāgārjuna’s negations of origina-
tion. Although Candrakīrti gives his implicit consent to Dignāga’s 
rule when he cites the fi rst half of PS 4.6 (NM 13), by replacing the 
last half of the verse with his own words, he makes this rule ap-
plicable to the Mādhyamika’s reasoning-for-others too, expecting 
that intelligent readers would recall that it is precisely the process 
Nāgārjuna, Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti himself have followed 
for teaching non-origination. 
1.3 Nāgārjuna’s teaching for others
Of course, Candrakīrti is also fully aware of the Madhyamaka 
stance that no kind of thesis (pratijñā), ascertainment (niścaya) or 
reasoning (upapatti) is established for the Mādhyamika himself. 
Before commencing his critique of Dignāga’s theory of valid cog-
nition (pramāṇa), Candrakīrti confi rms this.
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In the logicians’ system, one attains ascertainment (niścaya) by 
means of valid cognitions (pramāṇa), and if one wishes to gen-
erate the same ascertainment in others, one should make a the-
sis-statement in the form of an inferential proof (anumāna). Here a 
means of valid cognition (pramāṇa) plays the role of Candrakīrti’s 
reasoning (upapatti). The question may well arise as to whether 
Nāgārjuna’s ascertainment of non-origination is based on a means 
of valid cognition or not.40 Candrakīrti’s answer is clear: We have 
neither ascertainment (niścaya) nor non-ascertainment (aniścaya). 
Therefore, we do not need to conceive a means of valid cognition 
(pramāṇa).41
He further states that the saints have neither reasoning (upapat-
ti) nor non-reasoning (anupapatti) because for them there is solely 
ultimate reality (paramārtha) and silence (tūṣṇībhāva).42 The un-
derlying idea is that ultimate reality is ineﬀ able, beyond discur-
sive proliferation (prapañca) and free of dichotomizing conceptual 
construction (vikalpa). The saints experience ultimate reality in si-
lence. When they talk about it, it is only for the benefi t of others. 
At that time they may use reasonings in order to teach others, as 
Nāgārjuna and his successors have done. 
Even though the ineﬀ able ultimate is the fi nal goal of Madhyamaka 
philosophy, Candrakīrti still tries to justify Nāgārjuna’s teaching as 
reconcilable with inference-for-others. He explains Nāgārjuna’s in-
tent and method as regards MMK 1.1 as follows:
 40 Pr LVP 55, 11f.: atra kecit paricodayanti  / anutpannā bhāvā iti kim 
ayaṃ pramāṇajo niścaya utāpramāṇajaḥ  /. The unnamed opponents here 
(i.e., kecit) have generally been assumed to be Dignāga and his followers. 
The commentator Zhang Thang sag pa identifi es them as Dignāga and his 
disciples (dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka 27b5f.: phyogs kyi {glang : Ms. slang} 
po’i slob ma). MacDonald (2011), however, has proposed that the Naiyāyikas 
are the opponents being criticized.
 41 Pr LVP 56, 7f.: yadā caivaṃ niścayasyābhāvaḥ tadā kasya pra si-
ddhārthaṃ pramāṇāni parikalpayiṣyāmaḥ  /. This and the following seg-
ments are discussed in Arnold 2005: 146f.
 42 Pr LVP 57, 7f.: kiṃ khalv āryāṇām upapattir nāsti  / kenaitad uktam 
asti vā nāsti veti / paramārtho hy āry[āṇāṃ] tūṣṇībhāvaḥ tataḥ kutas tatra 
prapañcasaṃbhavo yad upapattir anupapattir vā syāt /.
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This statement (vākyaṃ) is ascertained (niścitaṃ) on the part of [peo-
ple in the] world (lokasya) through reasoning (upapattyā) that is ac-
knowledged solely by [them]selves, but [it is] not [ascertained] on the 
part of the saints (āryāṇām).43
Indeed, the saints do not utter any reasoning (upapatti) according to 
worldly transactional usage (lokasaṃvyavahāreṇa). Rather, having ac-
cepted (abhyupetya) reasoning (upapatti) that is acknowledged from 
[the viewpoint of] the world alone (lokata eva), for the purpose of 
awaking others (parāvabodhārtham) [the saints] awaken (bodhayanti) 
people (loka) exactly through this [reasoning].44
Although these two passages sound as if Candrakīrti is emphasiz-
ing the Mādhyamika’s rejection of logical tools, the point here is, 
on my reading, that he is implicitly demonstrating that Nāgārjuna’s 
procedure in setting forth MMK 1.1’s statement – a procedure bor-
rowed from the world – is impeccable, since it is said that his state-
ment has been ascertained through specifi c reasoning and taught 
to people using this very reasoning for the sake of their awakening. 
Candrakīrti here employs the word vākya for statement, which may 
sound less technical than pratijñā, but I do not see any essential 
diﬀ erence between the two; both refer to the statement that is to be 
presented for the sake of teaching others and substantiated by way 
of specifi c reasoning (upapatti). 
As regards the question of what Candrakīrti means with the 
expression “reasoning acknowledged from the viewpoint of the 
world alone” (lokata eva prasiddhopapatti), I would limit myself to 
suggesting that it might be considered a means of valid cognition 
(pramāṇa), though a pramāṇa like those of the Naiyāyika school, 
which counts four, viz., direct perception (pratyakṣa), inference 
(anumāna), scripture (āgama) and analogy (upamāna), because at 
the end of his imagined debate with Dignāga, Candrakīrti adduces 
these four kinds of pramāṇa and states that the general understand-
 43 Pr LVP 57, 5f.: ucyate niścitam idaṃ vākyaṃ lokasya svaprasiddhayaivo-
papattyā nāryāṇāṃ /.
 44 Pr LVP 57, 10f.: na khalv āryā lokasaṃvyavahāreṇopapattiṃ varṇa-
yanti, kiṃ tu lokata eva yā prasiddhopapattis tāṃ parāvabodhārtham 
 abhy u petya tayaiva lokaṃ bodhayanti /.
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ing of object-matters is established in the world through these four 
kinds of means of valid cognition.45
To conclude, one can justly assume that Candrakīrti has in-
terpreted Nāgārjuna’s statement as represented by MMK 1.1, as 
well as Buddhapālita’s presentation of it, as consisting in a log-
ical reasoning for others, the framework of which conforms to 
Dignāga’s inference-for-others. Candrakīrti thereby demonstrates 
the equivalence of the Mādhyamika’s reasoning-for-others and the 
logicians’ inference-for-others. In this limited sense, the former 
can be characterized as a pseudo inference-for-others, even though 
neither prasaṅga nor other-acknowledged inference (paraprasi-
ddhānumāna) is a genuine inference from Dignāga’s point of view.
2. Prasaṅga reasoning common to Candrakīrti and Dignāga and 
other-acknowledged inference
Both Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti interpret Buddhapālita’s commen-
tarial exposition of MMK 1.1 as presenting a prasaṅga reasoning:
(thesis, pratijñā:) Things do not arise from themselves.
(consequences, prasaṅga:) If one accepts the Sāṃkhya’s thesis that 
things arise from themselves, then their arising would be purposeless 
and there would be the fault of absurdity [due to infi nite regress].46 
The basic principle of prasaṅga reasoning is that based on the tem-
porary acceptance (abhyupagama) of the opponent’s thesis, one in-
dicates unwanted consequences for the opponent and thereby indi-
rectly proves the opposite of the opponent’s thesis. It is not a formal 
proof that establishes the proponent’s own thesis. What is used as 
 45 Pr LVP 75, 8: tad evaṃ pramāṇacatuṣṭayāl lokasyārthādhigamo 
vyavasthāpyate. In the later dGe lugs tradition, these four pramāṇas are ac-
cepted as those to be adopted in the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka system. See 
Yoshimizu 1996: 25–32. NSū 1.1.3 enumerates the four kinds of pramāṇas, 
stating pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdāḥ pramāṇāni. According to Kaji ya-
ma (1984: 20), the earliest account of these four pramāṇas appeared in the 
*Upādāyahdaya / *Prayogasāra (Fang Bian Xin Lun, 方便心論 24a01f.: 爲
四。一者現見。二者比知。三以喩知。四隨經書). 
 46 Cf. Pr LVP 14, 1–3 cited in n. 35. Regarding the constructions of this 
prasaṅga and its reversal (viparyaya), see Yoshimizu 2008: 82–86. 
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the thesis of the prasaṅga here is the mere negation of the oppo-
nent’s thesis. This kind of prasaṅga reasoning is often regarded to 
be peculiar to the Mādhyamika. By nature it is, however, almost the 
same as that described by Dignāga in his PS in the chapter on in-
ference-for-others (parārthānumāna); for him, prasaṅga reasoning 
is not formal proof (sādhana) but refutation (dūṣaṇa) of another’s 
thesis. Since neither a logical reason (hetu) nor an example (dṣṭā-
nta) is required for a prasaṅga reasoning, the reason does not need 
to meet the three conditions of a valid logical reason. In Dignāga’s 
own words, it is defi ned as follows:
(PS 3.14) In a certain case (yatra), an unwanted [consequence for the 
opponent] follows from [the viewpoint of the opponent’s] thesis (dam 
bca ,ʾ *pratijñā) and logical reason (gtan tshigs, *hetu). This [case] is 
recognized as confutation (lan, parihāra), since the consequence aris-
es (thal baʾi phyir, *prasaṅgāt)47 from [the viewpoint of] the [oppo-
nent’s thesis and logical reason].48 
(PS 3.17) Since the consequence (prasaṅga) does not have [a logical 
reason] as the property qualifying the subject (apakṣadharmatvāt), it 
states the faults in [the opponentʾs] thesis or logical reason after the 
acceptance (upagama) [of them]. Therefore it is understood as refuta-
tion (dūṣaṇa).49
 47 I tentatively prefer Kanakavarman’s translation (thal baʾi phyir, 
*prasaṅgāt) to Vasudhararakṣita’s translation (sbyor baʾi phyir, prayogāt), for 
the verse does not deal with a formal proof (prayoga). Katsura (2009: 158 
cited below) adopts Vasudhararakṣita’s translation.
 48 PS 3.14 (Katsura 2009: 160; Kitagawa 1973: 485): hetupratijñādvāreṇa 
yatrāniṣṭiḥ prasajyate  / taddvāreṇa prayogāt sa parihāra itīṣyate  // The 
Sanskrit has been reconstructed by Katsura; (Vasudhararakṣita tr.) dam bcaʾ 
rtags kyi ngag gis gang // mi dʾod pa la thal ba rtsom // de ni len zhes shes bya 
ste // de yi sgo nas sbyor phyir ro //; (Kanakavarman tr.) dam bcaʾ gtan tshigs 
sgo nas ni // gang zhig mi dʾod thal ʾgyur // de sgo nyid nas thal baʾi phyir // de 
ni lan zhes shes par bya //.
 49 PS 3.17 (Katsura 2009: 160; Kitagawa 1973: 487): prasaṅgo 
ʾpakṣadharmatvāt pūrvatropagame sati  / hetupratijñayos teṣāṃ doṣoktyā 
dūṣaṇaṃ gatam  //. The underlined Sanskrit has been reconstructed by 
Katsura; (Vasudhararakṣita tr.) thal ʾgyur phyogs chos can min phyir // khas 
blangs sngon du song ba las // de bzhin rtags dang dam bcaʾ yi // skyon brjod 
sun ʾbyin du shes bya //; (Kanakavarman tr.) thal ʾgyur phyogs chos can min 
phyir // sngon du khas blangs yod na ni // rtags dang dam bcaʾ gzhan dag la // 
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In his commentary on PS 3.14, Dignāga illustrates prasaṅga rea-
soning by adducing the Vaiśeṣika’s refutation of the Mīmāṃsaka’s 
proof of permanent sound. The Mīmāṃsaka formulates the in-
ference: “(thesis:) Sound is permanent, (reason:) because it has no 
form.”50 If one accepts this thesis and reason, the proof entails two 
unwanted consequences for the Mīmāṃsaka: 1) If one accepts the 
reason, it follows that action and so on, which have no form, would 
be permanent; 2) If one accepts the thesis, it follows that one would 
hear sound at all times. The fi rst consequence contradicts the fact 
that action is impermanent, which the Mīmāṃsaka himself ac-
cepts; the second consequence contradicts the fact that sound is 
not constantly audible, which is generally accepted in the world. 
In this way, based on the temporary acceptance (abhyupagama) of 
the opponent’s thesis and reason, one indicates consequences that 
are unwanted by the opponent. It is refutation rather than proof 
since the proponent does not present a logical reason and an ex-
ample from his side. This is exactly the same prasaṅga method 
Candrakīrti makes use of. 
Moreover, Dignāga says: “Here the Vaiśeṣika [refutes his oppo-
nent Mīmāṃsaka] by [stating] the thesis alone (dam bcaʾ ba tsam 
gyis, *pratijñāmātreṇa) [that sound is impermanent].”51 It is now 
not curious at all that Candrakīrti refers to Nāgārjuna’s negations 
in MMK 1.1 as “theses” (pratijñā), for they are the theses of pra-
saṅga reasonings.
The most crucial point in Candrakīrti’s argument against 
Bhāviveka’s use of an independent probative inference is that the 
inference incurs the fault of the proposition or thesis (pakṣadoṣa) 
skyon brjod sun ʾbyin shes par bya //. I do not translate teṣām.
 50 PSV (Kitagawa 1973: 485): (Vasudhararakṣita tr.) dper na sgra rtag pa 
ma yin te / las rtag par thal bar ʾgyur baʾi phyir ram / rtag tu dmigs par thal 
bar ʾgyur baʾi phyir ro //; (Kanakavarman tr.) dper na sgra ni rtag pa ma yin 
te / las la sogs pa rtag par thal baʾi phyir ram / rtag tu dmigs par thal baʾi 
phyir zhes bya ba dʾi ni lan yin te / gtan tshigs dang dam bcaʾ baʾi sgo nas khas 
blangs pa yod na thal ba bsgrub paʾi phyir ro // sngar ni lus can ma yin paʾi 
phyir rtag pa nyid khas blangs nas lan brjod pa yin la / dʾir ni dam bcaʾ ba 
tsam gyis yin no //. Cf. also NM (Katsura 1978: 117f.).
 51 PSV cited above in Kanakavarman’s Tibetan version.
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that its locus is not established (asiddhādhāra) and the fault of 
the logical reason (hetudoṣa) that it is not established in its sub-
stratum (āśrayāsiddha).52 As stated at the beginning of this paper, 
Bhāviveka’s proof does not meet the requirement that a valid log-
ical reason be a property which qualifi es the subject (pakṣadhar-
matva), since the subject is not established for Bhāviveka himself. 
As a result, Bhāviveka also cannot avoid violating the rule of com-
mon establishment. Candrakīrti thus indicates that Bhāviveka con-
travenes Dignāga’s stipulations for inference-for-others.
Because of its hypothetical nature, however, by Candrakīrti’s 
time the prasaṅga was held to have been a mere supplementary 
tool to formal inferential proof.53 Only after Dharmakīrti, and only 
because his successors link it with probative inference in its re-
versed form (i.e., prasaṅgaviparyaya), does it come to be accepted 
as a valid and eﬀ ective debate tool.54 Hence, for Candrakīrti, an ad-
equate form of proof that, unlike prasaṅga, would meet the logical 
requirements set forth by Dignāga, was a matter of necessity. The 
other-acknowledged inference (paraprasiddhānumāna), which 
is formally endowed with a logical reason and an example which 
ful fi ll the three conditions but whose subject, reason and example 
are established solely for the opponent, not for the Mādhyamika, 
was given this role. This proof can safely be said to perform the 
function of an inference-for-others because except for the fact that 
its subject and reason are not established as real for the propo-
nent, it is not diﬀ erent from a genuine inference-for-others. With 
it, Candrakīrti aimed to make it possible for Mādhyamikas to argue 
with their opponents on equal footing in a debate setting, although it 
is doubtful, given that this inference contravenes the rule of common 
establishment (ubhayasiddhatva), that other logicians accepted it.
 52 Cf. Pr LVP 27, 7ﬀ . (discussed in, e.g., Yoshimizu 2003: 279, n.21).
 53 According to Kajiyama (1987: 73), prasaṅga was known as a form of 
argument from the time of the Nyāyasūtra (3rd c.) under the name tarka. 
Bhāviveka criticizes Buddhapālita’s reasoning in the form of prasaṅga 
describing it as a “statement open to objection [from the opponent]” 
(sāvakāśavacana, glags yod paʾi tshig Prajp D49a7). For the term prasaṅga, 
cf. further Oberhammer 2006: 78 infra.
 54 Cf., e.g., Iwata 1993: 30–35.
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3. The rule of common establishment
The last obstacle to the Mādhyamika’s participation in debates with 
those who follow Dignāga’s logic is indeed the rule of common 
establishment. Dignāga describes it in his PS 3.11:
Because one makes [a thesis-statement in a debate] with a property 
[of the subject] (dharmeṇa) that is established for the two [parties in 
the debate], when [this property as a logical reason] is [assumed to 
be] the opposite for both or [even] one [of the parties], when [it is in] 
doubt [for both or for one] and when the property-possessor [i.e., the 
subject] is not established [for both or for one], [it is] not accepted [as 
a property of the subject].55
Since this rule theoretically disqualifi es the Madhyamaka infer-
ence-for-others, Candrakīrti rejects it. His point is that employment 
of an inferential proof whose reason is acknowledged by one party 
alone, i.e., by the opponent, is suﬃ  cient for refuting the opponent’s 
thesis. In support of his view, he notes that only the statement of the 
defendant involved in a legal dispute is able to decide the outcome 
of cases in courts of law.56 After citing the NM’s assertion that a 
 55 PS 3.11 (Katsura 2009: 157, Kitagawa 1973: 481): dvayoḥ siddhena 
dharmeṇa vyavahārād viparyaye / dvayor ekasya sandehe dharmyasiddhau 
ca neṣyate //; (Vasudhararakṣita tr.) gnyis ka la grub chos de las // tha snyad 
yin phyir gnyis ka laʾam // gang yang rung ba la bzlog paʾam // the tshom chos 
grub dʾod ma yin  //; (Kanakavarman tr.) gnyi ga la grub chos kyis ni  // tha 
snyad bya phyir gnyi ga dang // gcig la dogs dang the tshom dang // gzhi ma 
grub la mi dʾod do //. This verse is cited in Prajñākaragupta’s PVBh 647, 9. 
For references concerning this rule, see Seyfort Ruegg 1991: 286 n. 20 and 
2000: 245 n. 20.
 56 See Pr LVP 35, 1ﬀ .: lokata eva dṣtatvāt  / kadācid dhi loke ʾrthapra-
ty arthibhyāṃ pramāṇīktasya sākṣiṇo vacanena jayo bhavati parājayo vā 
kadācit svavacanena (R inserts eva; Tib. rang gi tshig kho nas) paravaca-
nena tu na jayo nāpi parājayaḥ /. Here it is pointed out that victory or defeat 
in legal disputes is determined by the words of either a witness or the defen-
dant, independent of what the plaintiﬀ  says. Victory or defeat does not occur 
on account of statements made by the plaintiﬀ . Similarly, it is the acknowl-
edgement of the inference by the Sāṃkhya opponent which brings about his 
defeat, and not any acknowledgement from the side of the Mādhyamika. Cf. 
the corresponding note on this passage in MacDonald forthcoming.
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reason serves as a proof (sādhana)57 or a refutation (dūṣaṇa) only if 
it is established for both parties,58 Candrakīrti claims that Dignāga 
should follow worldly convention and accept his rule (nyāya).59 I 
assume that with the term nyāya he intends to propose a new reg-
ular rule to replace the rule of common establishment, by way of 
which the Mādhyamika could eliminate the last obstacle to his ac-
tive involvement in debates.
In the Indian Madhyamaka tradition, however, Candrakīrti was 
presumably the only scholar who disobeyed the rule of common es-
tablishment. Later Mādhyamikas of the Svātantrika lineage com-
plied with it through maintaining that the Mādhyamika accepts the 
subject which commonly appears to both the Mādhyamika and his 
substantialist opponent. Jñānagarbha states that the common ap-
pearance of a property-possessor and its properties suﬃ  ces for the 
adducing of an inference, which shows his consent to the rule of 
 57 I read sādhana. In Pr LVP, the word pramāṇa appears for sādhana. The 
Tibetan versions and Pr R read sādhana. See below n. 58.
 58 NM (Katsura 1977: 124 and cited in Pr LVP 35, 5f.): ya eva ubhaya vi-
ni ścitavādī sa pramāṇaṃ (R sādhanaṃ) dūṣaṇaṃ vā nānyataraprasiddha-
saṃdigdhavācī.  Cf. also the citation in PVSV 153, 19f.: ya eva tūbhaya-
ni ścitavācī sa sādhanam dūṣaṇaṃ vā nānyataraprasiddhasaṃdigdhavā cī 
punaḥ sādha nāpekṣatvād. According to the twelfth verse of the PS, more-
over, a refutation (duṣaṇa) is also valid only if it is accepted by both par-
ties; if the opponent does not accept it, the proponent has to present anoth-
er proof. See PS 3.12 (Katsura 2009: 158; Kitagawa 1973: 482): nāniṣṭer 
dūṣaṇaṃ sarvaṃ prasiddhas tu dvayor api  / sādhanaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ vāsti sā-
dhanāpekṣaṇāt punaḥ  //. The underlined Sanskrit has been reconstructed 
by Katsura. “Not all that is concerned with something undesirable [for both 
parties] is refutation. Rather, when the [logical reason as a property of the 
subject] (pakṣadharma) is acknowledged by both parties, a proof or a refuta-
tion takes place. [When it is not the case, the logical reason as a property of 
the subject must be ascertained] again in dependence on [another] proof.” 
The Tibetan versions run as follows: (Vasudhararakṣita tr.) mi dʾod thams cad 
sun ʾbyin duʾang // gnyis kar rab tu grub na ni // sun ʾbyin pa ʾam grub pa yin // 
gzhan gyis slar yang bsgrubs na dʾod //; (Kanakavarman tr.) mi dʾod phyir kun 
sun ʾbyin min // gnyi ga la yang rab grub pa // sgrub par byed pa ʾam sun ʾbyin 
yin // gzhan yang bsgrub bya la ltos byed //.
 59 See Pr LVP 35, 6f.: ... iti tenāpi laukikāṃ vyavasthām anu ruddya-
mānen[ānumāne] yathokta eva nyāyo ʾbhyupeyaḥ /.
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common establishment on the conventional level of appearance.60 
Kamalaśīla accepts this idea as well.61 They are of the opinion that 
the Mādhyamika is thereby able to avoid the fallacy of non-es-
tablishment of the subject for the proponent (i.e., āśrayāsiddha). 
Taking this historical development into account, one must conclude 
that Candrakīrti’s attempt to abolish the rule of common establish-
ment failed, at least within the Indian Buddhist tradition.62 
Concluding remarks
Candrakīrti was more careful than Bhāviveka in regard to defend-
ing the Madhyamaka ontology of non-substantiality and avoid-
ing violation of Dignāga’s logical rules. Following Bhāviveka, 
Candrakīrti reconstructed the context of Nāgārjuna’s MMK 1.1 
negations and revealed a logical method for teaching others, which 
consists of the four steps (desire, ascertainment, thesis, and reason-
ing) that he borrowed from Dignāga and Bhāviveka. Candrakīrti 
thus showed that the Mādhyamikas presented their teachings for 
 60 See SDv 18–19 (cited and translated in Eckel 1987: 87f. and Keira 2004: 
147 n. 239): rgol ba gnyi gaʾi shes pa la // ji tsam snang baʾi cha yod pa // de 
tsam de la brten nas ni // chos can chos la sogs par rtog // de tshe rjes su dpag 
pa ʾbyung // gang gi tshe na gzhan na min // de bas rigs pa smra ba rnams // 
de skad smra la su zhig ʾgog //.
 61 See, e.g., MĀ D217b2ﬀ .: ... ji skad bshad paʾi tshul gyis rgol ba dang 
phyir rgol ba gnyi ga la yang chos thams cad gcig dang du ma dang bral ba 
tsam du grub paʾi phyir ro // rnam par bcad pa tsam zhig yin pa la ni bsgrub 
par bya ba dang / sgrub pa dang rjes su mthun paʾi chos can dngos por gyur 
pa ma yin pa rigs pa nyid do zhes sngar bstan zin to // des na rang dang gzhan 
gyi gzhung lugs la gnas pa rnams kyis nye bar brtags paʾi chos can la yang 
bsgrub paʾi chos rnam par bcad pa tsam gyis ji skad bshad pa gnyi ga la grub 
pa nyid do //.
 62 The Tibetan resurrection of Candrakīrti’s thought reopened the dis-
cussion of this issue. Employing the concept of common appearance by 
Jñānagarbha and Kamalaśīla, dGe lugs scholars deal with this rule by calling 
it “the establishment of common appearance” (mthun snang du grub pa). 
Cf. Tillemans 1982: 121 n. 18 and Yoshimizu 2003: 270–273, 280 n. 24. For 
Tibetans, acceptance of the rule of common establishment is one of the cri-
teria for the division of the two Madhyamaka branches, i.e., the Svātantrika 
and the Prāsaṅgika. 
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the sake of others following the model of the inference-for-others 
which consists of a thesis (pratijñā) and a reasoning (upapatti). 
That is to say, the Mādhyamikas were able to make the best use 
of reasonings-for-others in the form of either prasaṅgas or oth-
er-acknowledged inferences without contradicting their ontological 
position of the non-establishment of all things in ultimate reality. 
Candrakīrti’s fi nal aim is considered to have been the creation of 
an environment of debate where the Mādhyamika could legitimate-
ly argue and compete with others. For this purpose, he even revised 
the rule of common establishment, although the Indian logicians 
seem not to have listened to him. It is certain that Candrakīrti, like 
his predecessor Bhāviveka, had to adapt to the demands of the day 
for the survival of the Madhyamaka tradition.63
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